J.
Jamblichus on metempsychosis, ii. 426 n.
Jerome, St., on Plato and Aristotle, i. xv.
Johnson, Dr., on Berkeley, iv. 243 n.
Jouffroy, à priori element of cognition, iii. 119 n.
Judgment,
akin to proposition, and may be false, by partnership with form non-ens,
iii. 213-4;
implied in every act of consciousness, 165 n.
Just,
the holy a branch of the, i. 447;
and unjust, standard of the better, ii. 3;
whence knowledge of it, 4;
identified with the good, honourable, expedient, 7;
or Good is the profitable — general, but not constant,
explanation of Plato, 38;
the just, by law, not nature, Aristippus’ doctrine, i. 197.
Justice,
is it just, ii. 278;
varieties of meaning, i. 452 n.,
iv. 102,
120, 123, 125;
derivation of
δικαιοσύνη,
iii. 301 n.;
of δίκαιον, 308 n.;
with temperance, the condition of happiness and freedom, ii. 12;
and sense of shame possessed and taught by all citizens, 269;
how far like holiness, i. 447,
ii. 278;
opposition of natural and legal, 338, i. 197;
what is, iii. 416;
unsatisfactory answers of Sokrates and his friends, ib.;
is rendering what is owing, iv. 2;
rejected, 6;
is what is advantageous to the most powerful, 8;
modified, 9;
is the good of another, 10;
necessary to society and individual, injustice a source of weakness, 11;
is a source of happiness, 12,
14, 18;
is a compromise, 13;
good only from consequences, 15,
16, 99;
Xenophon on, 114
n.;
the received view anterior to Plato, 100;
a good per se, 20, 40, 84, 90, 116;
and from its consequences, 94,
121, 123, 294;
proved also by superiority of pleasures of intelligence, 84;
proof fails, 116,
118-21;
all-sufficient for happiness, germ of Stoical doctrine, 102;
inconsistent with actual facts, 106;
incorrect, for individual dependent on society, ib.,
123;
Plato’s affirmation true in a qualified sense, 125;
orthodoxy or dissent of just man must be taken into account, 126, 131;
in state, 34;
is in all classes, 36;
is performing one’s own function, ib.,
37, 39;
analogy to bodily health, 40;
what constitutes injustice,
367-9;
no man voluntarily wicked, 249,
365-7;
distinction of damage and injury, 366;
relation to rest of virtue, 428;
distinction effaced between temperance and, 135;
ethical basis imperfect, 127;
view peculiar to Plato, 99;
Platonic conception is self-regarding, 104;
motives to it arise from internal happiness of the just, 105;
view substantially maintained since,
ib.;
essential reciprocity in society, ii. 312, 333, iv. 100, 133;
the basis of Plato’s own theory of city’s genesis, 111;
incompletely stated, 112
n.;
any theory of society must present antithesis and correlation of
obligation and right, 112;
Xenophon’s definition unsatisfactory, i. 231;
Karneades, iv. 118
n.;
Epikurus, 130
n.;
Lucretius, ib.;
Pascal, i. 231
n.
K.
Κακία, derivation, iii. 301 n.
Kallikles, rhetor and politician, ii. 340.
Kallimachus,
Plato’s works known to, i. 276, 296 n.;
issued catalogue of Alexandrine library, 275.
Καλόν,
τό, translated by beautiful, ii. 49 n.;
defined, 327,
334;
rejected, ib.;
see Beautiful,
Honourable.
Kant, his Noumenon agrees with Ens of Parmenides, i. 21.
Kapila,
i. 378 n.;
analogy to Plato, ii. 389
n.
Karneades, on justice, iv. 118 n.
Kepler,
applied Pythagorean conception, i. 14 n.;
devotion to mathematics, iii. 388 n.
Kleitophon,
fragmentary, i. 268,
iii. 419,
424;
authenticity, i. 305-7,
309,
315, iii.
419 n.,
420, 426 n.;
posthumous, 420;
in Republic tetralogy, i. 406 n.,
iii. 419,
425;
represents the point of view of many objectors, 424;
scenery and persons, 413;
Sokrates has power in awakening ardour for virtue, 415;
but does not explain what virtue is,
ib.,
421-24;
what is justice or virtue, 416;
unsatisfactory replies of Sokrates’ friends,
ib.;
Kleitophon believes Sokrates knows but will not tell, 418;
compared with Republic, 425;
Apology, 421.
Know,
Aristotle on equivocal meaning of, ii. 213 n.;
to know and be known is action and passion, iii. 287 n.
Knowledge,
claim to universal, common to ancient philosophers, iii. 219;
kinds of, i. xii. n.;
of like by like, 44,
iv. 227;
Demokritus’ theory, i. 72,
76, 80;
Zeno, 98;
Gorgias the Leontine, 104;
Kyrenaics, 199,
204;
false persuasion of, the natural state of human mind,
Sokrates’ theory, 374,
414, ii. 166 n.,
218, 243, 263;
regarded as an ethical defect, iii. 177;
Sokrates’ mission, i. 374,
376, ii. 24, 146, 419, iii. 422, iv. 219;
search after, the business of life to Sokrates and Plato, i. 396;
per se interesting, 403;
necessity of scrutiny, 398
n.;
Mill on vagueness of common words, ii. 48 n.;
omnipotence of King Nomos, i. 378-84;
different views of Plato, iii. 163,
164 n.;
evolution of indwelling conceptions, i. 359 n.,
ii. 249,
iii. 17;
Sokrates’ mental obstetric, 112;
attained only by dialectic, i. 396;
its test, power of going through a Sokratic cross-examination,
ib.,
ii. 64;
genesis of, 391;
reminiscence of the ideas, 237, iii. 13, 17;
gods possess the Idea of, 67,
68 n.;
philosophy the perpetual accumulation of, ii. 112;
of good and evil, distinct from other sciences, 168;
necessary to use of good things, 205;
must include both making and right use205;
no action contrary to, 291;
virtue is, 239,
321, 67 n.,
149;
of what unsolved, 244;
to hurt knowingly or wilfully better than unwillingly, 58;
analogies from the arts, 59;
evil done by good man with, by bad without, 61;
as condition of human conduct, Sokrates and Plato dwell too exclusively
on, 67, 83;
rely too much on analogy of arts, and do not note what underlies
epithets, 68;
and moderation identical, having same contrary, 280;
of self, Delphian maxim, 11,
25;
from looking into other minds, is temperance, 12;
opposed to divine inspiration, 136;
no object of, distinct from knowledge itself, 156;
of ens alone, iv. 49;
all, relative to some object, ii. 157, 169;
is sensible perception, iii. 111,
113, 154, 172 n.;
erroneously identified with Homo Mensura, 113, 118, 120 n.,
125, 162 n.;
objections, sensible facts, different to different percipients, 153;
sensible perception does not include memory, 157;
argument from analogy of seeing and not seeing at the same time, ib.;
lies in the mind’s comparisons respecting sensible
perceptions, 161;
difference from modern views, 162;
the mind rises from sensation to opinion, then cognition, 164;
verification from experience, not recognised as necessary or possible, 168;
of good, identified with νοῦς, of other
things with δόξα, ii. 30;
relation to opinion, iii. 167 n.,
172, 184 n.;
are false opinions possible, 169;
waxen memorial tablet in the mind, ib.;
distinction of possessing and having actually in hand, 170;
simile of pigeon-cage, 171;
false opinion is the confusion of cognitions and non-cognitions,
refuted, ib.;
distinguished from right opinion, ii. 253, 255 n.,
iii. 168;
rhetor communicates true opinion, not knowledge, 172;
Plato’s compared with modern views, ii. 254;
is true opinion plus rational explanation, iii. 173;
analogy of elements and compounds,
ib.;
three meanings of rational explanation, 174;
definition rejected, 175;
antithesis of opinion and, not so marked in Politikus
as Theætêtus, 256;
opposite cognitions unlike each other, 336, 396;
pleasures of, true, 356,
387 n.;
good a mixture of pleasure and, 361;
same principle of classification applied to pleasure as to, 382;
classification of true and false, how applied to cognitions, 394;
its valuable principles, 395;
see Relativity,
Science, Self-knowledge.
Kosmos,
the first topic of Greek speculation, i. ix.;
primitive belief, 2;
early explanation by Polytheism, ib.;
Homer and Hesiod, ib.;
Thales, 4;
water once covered the earth, notices of the argument from prints of
shells and fishes, 18;
Anaximander, 5-7;
Anaximenes, 7-8;
Pythagoras, 12;
Pythagorean music of the spheres, 14;
Xenophanes, 18,
119 n.;
Parmenides, 24,
90 n.;
Herakleitus, 32;
Empedokles, 39,
41;
Diogenes of Apollonia, 64;
its Reason, different conceptions of Sokrates and Aristotle, ii. 402 n.;
soul prior to and more powerful than body, iv. 386, 419, 421;
the good and the bad souls at work in the universe, 386;
all things full of gods, 388;
soul of, iii. 265
n., iv. 421;
its position and elements, 225;
affinity of soul of, and human, iii. 366 n.;
mythe in Politikus, 265 n.;
divine steersman and dæmons,
ib.;
analogy of individual mind and cosmical process, i. 36 n.;
comparison of man to kosmos unnecessary and confusing,
iii. 367;
free from pleasure and pain, 389;
forced conjunction of kosmology and ethics, 391;
idea of good rules the ideal, as sun the visible, iv. 64;
simile of, absolute height and depth, 87;
unchangeable essences of, rarely studied, iii. 361;
aversion to studying, on ground of impiety, iv. 219 n.;
no knowledge of, obtainable, 220;
theory in Timæus acknowledged to be
merely an εἰκὼς
λόγος, 217;
Demiurgus, ideas, chaos postulated, 220;
Time began with the, 227;
is a living being and a god, 220,
223;
Demiurgus produces, by persuading Necessity, 220;
process of demiurgic construction, 223;
the copy of the
Αὐτόζωον,
ib.,
227, 235 n.,
264;
product of joint action of reason and necessity, 238;
body, spherical form, and rotations, i. 25 n.,
iv. 225,
229, 237, 252, 325 n.,
388-9;
to be studied for mental hygienic, 252;
primary and visible gods, 229;
secondary and generated gods, 230;
construction of man, 243;
generated gods fabricate cranium as miniature of kosmos, with rational
soul rotating within, 235;
four elements not primitive, 238;
action of Ideas on prime matter, 238;
Forms of the elements, ib.;
primordial chaos, 240;
geometrical theory of the elements, ib.;
borrowed
from Pythagoreans, i.
349 n.;
Aristotle on, iv. 241
n.;
varieties of each element, 242;
contrast of Plato’s admiration, with degenerate realities, 262, 264;
degeneracy originally intended, 263;
recurrence of destructive agencies, 270, 307;
change of view in Epinomis, 421, 424 n.
Krates,
the “door-opener,” i. 173;
Sokrates’ precepts fully carried out by Diogenes and, 160, 174.
Kratippus, the Peripatetic, i. 258 n.
Kratylus, purpose,
iii.
302-8, 309
n., 321, 323, 325 n.;
authenticity, i. 316;
date, 306,
309, 310, 312;
subject and personages, iii. 285;
speaking and naming conducted according to fixed laws, 286;
names distinguished by Plato as true or false,
ib. n.;
connected with doctrine of Ideas, 326 n.;
the thing spoken of suffers, 287 n.;
name, a didactic instrument, made by lawgiver on type of name-form, 287, 312, 329;
Plato’s idéal, 325, 328 n.,
329;
compared with his views on social institutions, 327;
natural rectitude of names, 289,
300 n.,
305 n.;
names vary in degree of aptitude, 319;
aptitude consists in resemblance, 313;
difficult to harmonise with facts, 323;
forms of names and of things nameable, 289;
lawgiver alone discerns essences of names, and assigns them correctly, 290;
proofs cited from etymology, 299,
300 n.,
307 n.;
not caricatures of sophists, 302,
304, 310 n.,
314 n.,
321, 323;
the etymologies serious, 306-12,
317 n.;
counter-theory, Homo Mensura, 291, 326 n.;
objection, it levels all animals, 292;
analogy of physical processes, unsuitable, 294;
belief not dependent on will, 297;
first imposer of names a Herakleitean, 301 n.,
314-5, 320
n.;
how names have become disguised, 312;
changes hard to follow, 315;
onomastic art, letters as well as things must be distinguished with
their essential properties, 313;
Herakleitean theory admitted, 317;
some names not consistent with it, 319;
things known only through names, not true, 320;
Herakleitean flux, true of particulars, not of Ideas, ib.;
the theory uncertain, implicit trust not to be put in names, 321, 324;
compared with Politikus, 281, 329;
Sophistês. 331;
Timæus,
ib.;
various reading in, p. 429c, 317 n.
Krete,
unlettered community, iv. 277;
public training and mess, 279;
its customs peculiar to itself and Sparta, 280 n.
Kritias, a fragment,
i. 268,
iv. 265;
probably would have been an ethical epic in prose, 269;
in Republic tetralogy, 215, 265;
date, i. 309,
311-3, 315,
325;
authenticity, 307,
iv. 266 n.;
subject, 266;
citizens of Plato’s state identified with ancient Athenians, ib.;
Solon and Egyptian priests, ib.,
268;
explanation of their learning, 271;
island Atlantis and its kings, 268;
address of Zeus, 269;
corruption and wickedness of people, ib.;
submergence, 270;
mythe incomplete, iii. 409
n.;
presented as matter of history, iv. 270;
recurrence of destructive kosmical agencies,
ib.
Kriton, rhetorical,
not dialectical, i. 433;
compared with Gorgias, ii. 362;
general purpose, subject, and interlocutors, i. 425, 428;
authority of public judgment, nothing, of Expert, everything, 420, 435;
Sokrates does not name, but himself acts as, expert, 436;
Sokrates’ answer to Kriton’s appeal to flee, 426;
Sokrates’ principle, Never act unjustly, 427;
this a cardinal point, though most men differ
from him,
ib.;
character and disposition of Sokrates, differently set forth, 428;
imaginary pleading of the Laws of Athens,
ib.;
agreement with Athenian democratic sentiment, 430, 432;
Plato’s purpose in this, 428;
attempts reconciliation of constitutional allegiance with
Sokrates’ individuality, 432;
Sokrates characteristics overlooked in the harangue, 431;
maintained by his obedience from conviction,
ib.
Kyrenaics,
scheme of life, i. 188;
ethical theory, 195;
logical theory, 197;
doctrine of relativity, ib.,
204;
Æthiops, Antipater, and Arêtê, 195;
Theodorus on the gods, 202;
see Aristippus,
Hegesias.
L.
Lachês,
authenticity, i. 305,
ii. 151;
date, i. 304,
306,
308-10, 312,
315, 328, 331 n.;
subject and interlocutors, ii. 138;
dramatic contrast of Lachês and Sokrates, 150;
should lessons be received from a master of arms, 138;
Sokrates refers to a professional judge, 139;
the judge must prove his competence, Sokrates confesses incompetence, 140;
marks of the Expert, 141;
education — virtue must first be known, 142;
courage, 143;
example instead of definition, ib.;
not endurance, 144;
intelligence of things terrible and not terrible, 145, iv. 138;
such intelligence not possessed by professional artists, ii. 148;
but is an inseparable part of knowledge of good and evil generally, 149;
intelligence of good and evil generally — too wide, 146;
apparent tendency of Plato’s mind in looking for a solution, 147;
compared with Theagês, 104;
Charmidês, 168;
Politikus, iii. 282-4;
Republic, iv. 138.
Lactantius, the soul, ii. 425 n.
Land,
division of, twelve tribes, iv. 329;
perpetuity of lots of, 326,
360;
Aristotle on, 326
n.;
succession, 328,
404;
distribution of annual produce, 361.