| CHAPTER XXVI. |
|
PHÆDRUS — SYMPOSION. |
| These
two are the two erotic dialogues of Plato. Phædrus
is the originator of both |
1 |
| Eros
as conceived by Plato. Different sentiment prevalent in
Hellenic
antiquity and in modern times. Position of women in Greece
|
ib. |
| Eros,
considered as the great stimulus to improving
philosophical communion.
Personal Beauty, the great point of approximation between
the world of
sense and the world of Ideas. Gradual generalisation of
the sentiment |
4 |
| All
men love Good, as the means of Happiness, but they pursue
it by various means. The name Eros is confined to
one special case of this large variety |
5 |
| Desire
of mental copulation and procreation, as the only
attainable likeness
of immortality, requires the sight of personal beauty as
an originating
stimulus |
6 |
| Highest
exaltation
of the erotic impulse in a few privileged minds, when it
ascends gradually to the love of Beauty in general. This
is the most
absorbing sentiment of all |
7 |
| Purpose
of
the Symposion, to contrast this Platonic view of Eros with
several
different views of it previously enunciated by the other
speakers;
closing with a panegyric on Sokrates, by the drunken
Alkibiades |
8 |
| Views
of Eros presented by Phædrus, Pausanias,
Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon |
9 |
| Discourse
of
Sokrates from revelation of Diotima. He describes Eros as
not a God,
but an intermediate Dæmon between Gods and men,
constantly aspiring to
divinity, but not attaining it |
9 |
| Analogy
of the erotic aspiration with that of the philosopher, who
knows his own ignorance and thirsts for knowledge |
10 |
| Eros
as presented in the Phædrus — Discourse of Lysias,
and counter-discourse
of Sokrates, adverse to Eros — Sokrates is seized with
remorse, and
recants in a high-flown panegyric on Eros |
11 |
| Panegyric
— Sokrates
admits that the influence of Eros is a variety of madness,
but
distinguishes good and bad varieties of madness, both
coming from the
Gods. Good madness is far better than sobriety |
ib. |
| Poetical
mythe
delivered by Sokrates, describing the immortality and
pre-existence of the soul, and its pre-natal condition of
partial
companionship with Gods and eternal Ideas |
12 |
| Operation
of
such pre-natal experience upon the Intellectual faculties
of
man — Comparison and combination of particular sensations
indispensable — Reminiscence |
13 |
| Reminiscence
is
kindled up in the soul of the philosopher by the aspect of
visible
Beauty, which is the great link between the world of sense
and the
world of Ideas |
14 |
| Elevating
influence
ascribed, both in Phædrus and Symposion, to Eros
Philosophus. Mixture in the mind of Plato, of poetical
fancy and
religious mysticism, with dialectic theory |
15 |
| Differences
between Symposion and Phædrus. In-dwelling
conceptions assumed by the former, pre-natal experiences
by the latter |
17 |
| Nothing
but metaphorical immortality recognised in Symposion |
ib. |
| Form
or Idea of Beauty presented singly and exclusively in
Symposion |
18 |
| Eros
recognised, both in Phædrus and Symposion, as
affording the initiatory
stimulus to philosophy — Not so recognised in
Phædon, Theætêtus, and
elsewhere |
ib. |
| Concluding
scene and speech of Alkibiades in the Symposion —
Behaviour of Sokrates to Alkibiades and other handsome
youths |
19 |
| Perfect
self-command of Sokrates — proof against every sort of
trial |
20 |
| Drunkenness
of others at the close of the Symposion — Sokrates is not
affected by it, but continues his dialectic process |
21 |
| Symposion
and Phædon — each is the antithesis and complement
of the other |
22 |
| Symposion
of Plato compared with that of Xenophon |
ib. |
| Small
proportion of the serious, in the Xenophontic Symposion |
24 |
| Platonic
Symposion more ideal and transcendental than the
Xenophontic |
25 |
| Second
half of the Phædrus — passes into a debate on
Rhetoric. Eros is considered as a subject for rhetorical
exercise |
26 |
| Lysias
is
called a logographer by active politicians. Contempt
conveyed by the
word. Sokrates declares that the only question is, Whether
a man writes
well or ill |
27 |
| Question
about
teaching the art of writing well or speaking well. Can it
be
taught upon system or principle? Or does the successful
Rhetor succeed
only by unsystematic knack? |
28 |
| Theory
of
Sokrates — that all art of persuasion must be founded upon
a
knowledge of the truth, and of gradations of resemblance
to the truth |
ib. |
| Comparison
made
by Sokrates between the discourse of Lysias and his own.
Eros is
differently understood: Sokrates defined what he meant by
it: Lysias
did not define |
29 |
| Logical
processes — Definition and Division — both of them
exemplified in the two discourses of Sokrates |
ib. |
| View
of Sokrates — that there is no real Art of Rhetoric,
except what is
already comprised in Dialectic — The rhetorical teaching
is empty and
useless |
30 |
| What
the Art of Rhetoric ought to be — Analogy of Hippokrates
and the medical Art |
31 |
| Art
of Rhetoric ought to include a systematic classification
of minds with
all their varieties, and of discourses with all their
varieties. The
Rhetor must know how to apply the one to the other,
suitably to each
particular case |
32 |
| The
Rhetorical Artist must farther become possessed of real
truth, as well
as that which his auditors believe to be truth. He is not
sufficiently
rewarded for this labour |
33 |
| Question
about
Writing — As an Art, for the purpose of instruction, it
can do
little — Reasons why. Writing may remind the reader of
what he already
knows |
ib. |
| Neither
written
words, nor continuous speech, will produce any serious
effect
in teaching. Dialectic and cross-examination are necessary
|
34 |
| The
Dialectician and Cross-Examiner is the only man who can
really teach. If the writer can do this, he is more than a
writer |
37 |
| Lysias
is only a logographer: Isokrates promises to become a
philosopher |
38 |
| Date
of the Phædrus — not an early dialogue |
ib. |
| Criticism
given by Plato on the three discourses — His theory of
Rhetoric is more Platonic than Sokratic |
ib. |
| His
theory postulates, in the Rhetor, knowledge already
assured — it assumes that all the doubts have been already
removed |
39 |
| The
Expositor, with knowledge and logical process, teaches
minds unoccupied and willing to learn |
ib. |
| The
Rhetor does not teach, but persuades persons with minds
pre-occupied — guiding them methodically from error to
truth |
40 |
| He
must then classify the minds to be persuaded, and the
means of
persuasion or varieties of discourse. He must know how to
fit on the
one to the other in each particular case |
41 |
| Plato’s
Idéal
of the Rhetorical Art — involves in part incompatible
conditions — the
Wise man or philosopher will never be listened to by the
public |
ib. |
| The
other part of the Platonic Idéal is grand
but unattainable — breadth of psychological data and
classified modes of discourse |
42 |
| Plato’s
ideal
grandeur compared with the rhetorical teachers —
Usefulness of
these teachers for the wants of an accomplished man |
44 |
| The
Rhetorical teachers conceived the Art too narrowly: Plato
conceived it
too widely. The principles of an Art are not required to
be explained
to all learners |
45 |
| Plato
includes in his conception of Art, the application thereof
to new particular cases. This can never be taught by rule
|
46 |
| Plato’s
charge against the Rhetorical teachers is not made out |
47 |
| Plato
has not treated Lysias fairly, in neglecting his greater
works, and
selecting for criticism an erotic exercise for a private
circle |
47 |
| No
fair comparison can be taken between this exercise of
Lysias and the discourses delivered by Sokrates in the
Phædrus |
48 |
| Continuous
discourse, either written or spoken, inefficacious as a
means of instruction to the ignorant |
49 |
| Written
matter is useful as a memorandum for persons who know — or
as an elegant pastime |
50 |
| Plato’s
didactic theories are pitched too high to be realised |
51 |
| No
one has ever been found competent to solve the
difficulties raised by
Sokrates, Arkesilaus, Karneades, and the negative vein of
philosophy |
ib. |
| Plato’s
idéal
philosopher can only be realised under the hypothesis of a
pre-existent
and omniscient soul, stimulated into full reminiscence
here |
52 |
| Different
proceeding of Plato in the Timæus |
53 |
| Opposite
tendencies
co-existent in Plato’s mind — Extreme of the
Transcendental
or Absolute — Extreme of specialising adaptation to
individuals and
occasions |
54 |
| |
| |
| |
| CHAPTER XXVII. |
|
PARMENIDES. |
| Character
of dialogues immediately preceding — much transcendental
assertion. Opposite character of the Parmenides |
56 |
| Sokrates
is
the juvenile defendant — Parmenides the veteran censor and
cross-examiner. Parmenides gives a specimen of exercises
to be
performed by the philosophical aspirant |
ib. |
| Circumstances
and persons of the Parmenides |
57 |
| Manner
in which the doctrine of Parmenides was impugned. Manner
in which his partisan Zeno defended him |
58 |
| Sokrates
here
impugns the doctrine of Zeno. He affirms the Platonic
theory of
ideas separate from sensible objects, yet participable by
them |
60 |
| Parmenides
and
Zeno admire the philosophical ardour of Sokrates.
Parmenides
advances objections against the Platonic theory of Ideas |
60 |
| What
Ideas does Sokrates recognise? Of the Just and Good? Yes.
Of Man, Horse, &c.? Doubtful. Of Hair, Mud, &c.?
No |
ib. |
| Parmenides
declares that no object in nature is mean to the
philosopher |
61 |
| Remarks
upon this — Contrast between emotional and scientific
classification |
ib. |
| Objections
of Parmenides — How can objects participate in the Ideas.
Each cannot have the whole Idea, nor a part thereof |
62 |
| Comparing
the
Idea with the sensible objects partaking in the Idea,
there
is a likeness between them which must be represented by a
higher
Idea — and so on ad infinitum |
63 |
| Are
the Ideas conceptions of the mind, and nothing more?
Impossible |
64 |
| The
Ideas are types or exemplars, and objects partake of them
by being likened to them. Impossible |
65 |
| If
Ideas exist, they cannot be knowable by us. We can know
only what is
relative to ourselves. Individuals are relative to
individuals: Ideas
relative to Ideas |
ib. |
| Forms
can be known only through the Form of Cognition, which we
do not possess |
66 |
| Form
of cognition, superior to our Cognition, belongs to the
Gods. We cannot know them, nor can they know us |
ib. |
| Sum
total of objections against the Ideas is grave. But if we
do not admit
that Ideas exist, and that they are knowable, there can be
no dialectic
discussion |
67 |
| Dilemma
put by Parmenides — Acuteness of his objections |
68 |
| The
doctrine which Parmenides attacks is the genuine Platonic
theory of
Ideas. His objections are never answered in any part of
the Platonic
dialogues |
ib. |
| Views
of Stallbaum and Socher. The latter maintains that Plato
would never
make such objections against his own theory, and denies
the
authenticity of the Parmenidês |
69 |
| Philosophers
are usually advocates, each of a positive system of his
own |
70 |
| Different
spirit of Plato in his Dialogues of Search |
ib. |
| The
Parmenidês is the extreme manifestation of the
negative element. That
Plato should employ one dialogue in setting forth the
negative case
against the Theory of Ideas is not unnatural |
71 |
| Force
of the negative case in the Parmenidês. Difficulties
about participation of sensible objects in the world of
Ideas |
ib. |
| Difficulties
about
the Cognizability of Ideas. If Ideas are absolute, they
cannot be
cognizable: if they are cognizable, they must be relative.
Doctrine of
Homo Mensura |
72 |
| Answer
of Sokrates — That Ideas are mere conceptions of the mind.
Objection of Parmenides correct, though undeveloped |
73 |
| Meaning
of
Abstract and General Terms, debated from ancient times to
the
present day — Different views of Plato and Aristotle upon
it |
76 |
| Plato
never expected to make his Ideas fit on to the facts of
sense: Aristotle tried to do it and partly succeeded |
78 |
| Continuation
of
the Dialogue — Parmenides admonishes Sokrates that he has
been
premature in delivering a doctrine, without sufficient
preliminary
exercise |
79 |
| What
sort of exercise? Parmenides describes: To assume
provisionally both
the affirmative and the negative of many hypotheses about
the most
general terms, and to trace the consequences of each |
ib. |
| Impossible
to
do this before a numerous audience — Parmenides is
entreated to give
a specimen — After much solicitation he agrees |
80 |
| Parmenides
elects his own theory of the Unum, as the topic
for exhibition — Aristoteles becomes respondent |
ib. |
| Exhibition
of Parmenides — Nine distinct deductions or
Demonstrations, first from Unum Est — next from Unum
non Est |
81 |
| The
Demonstrations in antagonising pairs, or Antinomies.
Perplexing entanglement of conclusions given without any
explanation |
ib. |
| Different
judgments of Platonic critics respecting the Antinomies
and the dialogue generally |
82 |
| No
dogmatical solution or purpose is wrapped up in the
dialogue. The
purpose is negative, to make a theorist keenly feel all
the
difficulties of theorising |
85 |
| This
negative purpose is expressly announced by Plato himself.
All
dogmatical purpose, extending farther, is purely
hypothetical, and even
inconsistent with what is declared |
87 |
| The
Demonstrations or Antinomies considered. They include much
unwarranted
assumption and subtlety. Collection of unexplained
perplexities or ἀπορίαι |
88 |
| Even
if Plato himself saw through these subtleties, he might
still choose to
impose and to heap up difficulties in the way of a forward
affirmative
aspirant |
89 |
| The
exercises exhibited by Parmenides are exhibited only as
illustrative specimens of a method enjoined to be applied
to many other Antinomies |
91 |
| These
Platonic Antinomies are more formidable than any of the
sophisms or subtleties broached by the Megaric
philosophers |
ib. |
| In
order to understand fully the Platonic Antinomies, we
ought to have
before us the problems of the Megarics and others.
Uselessness of
searching for a positive result |
93 |
| Assumptions
of
Parmenides in his Demonstrations convey the minimum of
determinate
meaning. Views of Aristotle upon these indeterminate
predicates, Ens,
Unum, &c. |
94 |
| In
the Platonic Demonstrations the same proposition in words
is made to bear very different meanings |
95 |
| First
demonstration ends in an assemblage of negative
conclusions. Reductio ad Absurdum, of the
assumption — Unum non Multa |
96 |
| Second
Demonstration |
97 |
| It
ends in demonstrating Both, of that which the
first Demonstration had demonstrated Neither |
98 |
| Startling
paradox — Open offence against logical canon — No logical
canon had then been laid down |
99 |
| Demonstration
third — Attempt to reconcile the contradiction of
Demonstrations I. and II. |
100 |
| Plato’s
imagination of the Sudden or Instantaneous — Breaches or
momentary stoppages in the course of time |
ib. |
| Review
of
the successive pairs of Demonstrations or Antinomies in
each, the
first proves the Neither, the second proves the Both |
101 |
| The
third Demonstration is mediatorial but not satisfactory —
The hypothesis of the Sudden or Instantaneous found no
favour |
102 |
| Review
of the two last Antinomies. Demonstrations VI. and VII. |
103 |
| Demonstration
VII. is founded upon the genuine doctrine of Parmenides |
104 |
| Demonstrations
VI.
and VII. considered — Unwarrantable steps in the reasoning
— The
fundamental premiss differently interpreted, though the
same in words |
105 |
| Demonstrations
VIII. and IX. — Analysis of Demonstration VIII. |
106 |
| Demonstration
VIII. is very subtle and Zenonian |
107 |
| Demonstration
IX. Neither following Both |
ib. |
| Concluding
words
of the Parmenides — Declaration that he has demonstrated
the Both
and the Neither of many different propositions |
108 |
| Comparison
of
the conclusion of the Parmenides to an enigma of the
Republic.
Difference. The constructor of the enigma adapted its
conditions to a
foreknown solution. Plato did not |
ib. |
| |
| |
| |
| CHAPTER XXVIII. |
|
THEÆTETUS. |
| Subjects
and personages in the Theætêtus |
110 |
| Question
raised
by Sokrates — What is knowledge or Cognition? First answer
of
Theætêtus, enumerating many different
cognitions. Corrected by Sokrates
|
111 |
| Preliminary
conversation
before the second answer is given. Sokrates describes his
own peculiar efficacy — mental obstetric — He cannot
teach, but he can
evolve knowledge out of pregnant minds |
112 |
| Ethical
basis of the cross-examination of Sokrates — He is
forbidden to pass by falsehood without challenge |
113 |
| Answer
of Theætêtus — Cognition is sensible
perception: Sokrates says that this is the same doctrine
as the Homo Mensura
laid down by Protagoras, and that both are in close
affinity with the
doctrines of Homer, Herakleitus, Empedoklês,
&c., all except
Parmenides |
ib. |
| Plato
here blends together three distinct theories for the
purpose of
confuting them; yet he also professes to urge what can be
said in
favour of them. Difficulty of following his exposition |
114 |
| The
doctrine of Protagoras is completely distinct from the
other doctrines.
The identification of them as one and the same is only
constructive — the interpretation of Plato himself |
115 |
| Explanation
of the doctrine of Protagoras — Homo Mensura |
116 |
| Perpetual
implication of Subject with Object — Relate and Correlate
|
118 |
| Such
relativity is no less true in regard to the ratiocinative
combinations
of each individual, than in regard to his percipient
capacities |
ib. |
| Evidence
from Plato proving implication of Subject and Object, in
regard to the intelligible world |
121 |
| The
Protagorean measure is even more easily shown in reference
to the intelligible world than in reference to sense |
122 |
| Object
always relative to Subject — Either without the other,
impossible. Plato admits this in Sophistes |
126 |
| Plato’s
representation of the Protagorean doctrine in intimate
conjunction with the Herakleitean |
126 |
| Relativity
of sensible facts, as described by him |
ib. |
| Relations
are nothing in the object purely and simply without a
comparing subject |
127 |
| Relativity
twofold — to the comparing Subject — to another object,
besides the one directly described |
ib. |
| Statement
of the doctrine of Herakleitus — yet so as to implicate it
with that of Protagoras |
128 |
| Agent
and Patient — No absolute Ens |
129 |
| Arguments
derived from dreams, fevers, &c., may be answered |
130 |
| Exposition
of
the Protagorean doctrine, as given here by Sokrates is to
a great
degree just. You cannot explain the facts of consciousness
by
independent Subject and Object |
131 |
| Plato’s
attempt to get behind the phenomena. Reference to a double
potentiality — Subjective and Objective |
133 |
| Arguments
advanced
by the Platonic Sokrates against the Protagorean doctrine.
He
says that it puts the wise and foolish on a par — that it
contradicts
the common consciousness. Not every one, but the wise man
only, is a
measure |
135 |
| In
matters of present sentiment every man can judge for
himself. Where
future consequences are involved special knowledge is
required |
136 |
| Plato,
when
he impugns the doctrine of Protagoras, states that
doctrine
without the qualification properly belonging to it. All
belief relative
to the condition of the believing mind |
137 |
| All
exposition and discussion is an assemblage of individual
judgments and
affirmations. This fact is disguised by elliptical forms
of language |
139 |
| Argument
— That
the Protagorean doctrine equalises all men and animals.
How far true.
Not true in the sense requisite to sustain Plato’s
objection |
141 |
| Belief
on authority is true to the believer himself — The
efficacy of authority resides in the believer’s own mind |
142 |
| Protagorean
formula — is false, to those who dissent from it |
143 |
| Plato’s
argument that the wise man alone is a measure — Reply to
it |
ib. |
| Plato’s
argument as to the distinction between present sensation
and anticipation of the future |
145 |
| The
formula of Relativity does not imply that every man
believes himself to be infallible |
ib. |
| Plato’s
argument
is untenable — That if the Protagorean formula be
admitted,
dialectic discussion would be annulled — The reverse is
true — Dialectic
recognises the autonomy of the Individual mind |
146 |
| Contrast
with the Treatise De Legibus — Plato assumes infallible
authority — sets aside Dialectic |
148 |
| Plato
in denying the Protagorean formula, constitutes himself
the measure for all. Counter-proposition to the formula |
ib. |
| Import
of the Protagorean formula is best seen when we state
explicitly the counter-proposition |
150 |
| Unpopularity
of
the Protagorean formula — Most believers insist upon
making
themselves a measure for others, as well as for
themselves. Appeal to
Abstractions |
150 |
| Aristotle
failed
in his attempts to refute the Protagorean formula — Every
reader
of Aristotle will claim the right of examining for himself
Aristotle’s
canons of truth |
152 |
| Plato’s
examination
of the other doctrine — That knowledge is Sensible
Perception. He adverts to sensible facts which are
different with
different Percipients |
153 |
| Such
is not the case with all the facts of sense. The
conditions of
unanimity are best found among select facts of sense —
weighing,
measuring, &c. |
154 |
| Arguments
of
Sokrates in examining this question. Divergence between
one man and
another arises, not merely from different sensual
impressibility, but
from mental and associative difference |
155 |
| Argument
— That
sensible Perception does not include memory — Probability
that those who
held the doctrine meant to include memory |
157 |
| Argument
from the analogy of seeing and not seeing at the same time
|
ib. |
| Sokrates
maintains that we do not see with our eyes, but
that the mind sees through the eyes: that the mind
often conceives and judges by itself without the aid of
any bodily organ |
159 |
| Indication
of several judgments which the mind makes by itself — It
perceives Existence, Difference, &c. |
160 |
| Sokrates
maintains
that knowledge is to be found, not in the Sensible
Perceptions themselves, but in the comparisons add
computations of the
mind respecting them |
161 |
| Examination
of this view — Distinction from the views of modern
philosophers |
162 |
| Different
views given by Plato in other dialogues |
163 |
| Plato’s
discussion
of this question here exhibits a remarkable advance in
analytical psychology. The mind rises from Sensation,
first to Opinion,
then to Cognition |
164 |
| Plato
did not recognise Verification from experience, or from
facts of sense, as either necessary or possible |
168 |
| Second
definition given by Theætêtus — That Cognition
consists in right or true opinion |
ib. |
| Objection
by
Sokrates — This definition assumes that there are false
opinions. But
how can false opinions be possible? How can we conceive
Non-Ens: or
confound together two distinct realities? |
ib. |
| Waxen
memorial tablet in the mind, on which past impressions are
engraved.
False opinion consists in wrongly identifying present
sensations with
past impressions |
169 |
| Sokrates
refutes this assumption. Dilemma. Either false opinion is
impossible, or else a man may know what he does not know |
170 |
| He
draws distinction between possessing knowledge, and having
it actually
in hand. Simile of the pigeon-cage with caught pigeons
turned into it
and flying about |
ib. |
| Sokrates
refutes
this. Suggestion of Theætêtus — That there may
be non-cognitions
in the mind as well as cognitions, and that false opinion
may consist
in confounding one with the other. Sokrates rejects this |
171 |
| He
brings another argument to prove that Cognition is not the
same as true
opinion. Rhetors persuade or communicate true opinion; but
they do not
teach or communicate knowledge |
172 |
| New
answer of Theætêtus — Cognition is true
opinion, coupled with rational explanation |
173 |
| Criticism
on
the answer by Sokrates. Analogy of letters and words,
primordial
elements and compounds. Elements cannot be explained:
compounds alone
can be explained |
ib. |
| Sokrates
refutes this criticism. If the elements are unknowable,
the compound must be unknowable also |
174 |
| Rational
explanation
may have one of three different meanings. 1. Description
in
appropriate language. 2. Enumeration of all the component
elements in
the compound. In neither of these meanings will the
definition of
Cognition hold |
ib. |
| Third
meaning. To assign some mark, whereby the thing to be
explained differs
from everything else. The definition will not hold. For
rational
explanation, in this sense, is already included in true
opinion |
175 |
| Conclusion
of the dialogue — Summing up by Sokrates — Value of the
result, although purely negative |
176 |
| Remarks
on the dialogue. View of Plato. False persuasion of
knowledge removed. Importance of such removal |
ib. |
| Formation
of
the testing or verifying power in men’s minds, value of
the
Theætêtus, as it exhibits Sokrates demolishing
his own suggestions |
177 |
| Comparison
of the Philosopher with the Rhetor. The Rhetor is enslaved
to the opinions of auditors |
178 |
| The
Philosopher is master of his own debates |
179 |
| Purpose
of dialogue to qualify for a life of philosophical Search
|
ib. |
| Difficulties
of the Theætêtus are not solved in any other
Dialogue |
180 |
| Plato
considered that the search for Truth was the noblest
occupation of life |
182 |
| Contrast
between the philosopher and the practical statesman —
between Knowledge and Opinion |
183 |
| |
| |
| |
| CHAPTER XXIX. |
|
SOPHISTES — POLITIKUS. |
| Persons
and circumstances of the two dialogues |
185 |
| Relation
of the two dialogues to the Theætêtus |
187 |
| Plato
declares that his first purpose is to administer a lesson
in logical
method: the special question chosen, being subordinate to
that purpose |
188 |
| Method
of logical Definition and Division |
ib. |
| Sokrates
tries
the application of this method, first, upon a vulgar
subject. To
find the logical place and deduction of the Angler.
Superior classes
above him. Bisecting division |
189 |
| Such a
lesson in logical classification was at that time both
novel and instructive. No logical manuals then existed |
190 |
| Plato
describes the Sophist as analogous to an angler. He traces
the Sophist
by descending subdivision from the acquisitive genus of
art |
191 |
| The
Sophist traced down from the same, by a second and
different descending subdivision |
192 |
| Also,
by a third |
193 |
| The
Sophist is traced down, from the genus of separating or
discriminating art |
194 |
| In
a logical classification, low and vulgar items deserve as
much
attention as grand ones. Conflict between emotional and
scientific
classification |
195 |
| The
purifier — a species under the genus discriminator —
separates good from
evil. Evil is of two sorts; the worst sort is, Ignorance,
mistaking
itself for knowledge |
197 |
| Exhortation
is
useless against this worst mode of evil.
Cross-examination, the
shock of the Elenchus, must be brought to bear upon it.
This is the
sovereign purifier |
ib. |
| The
application of this Elenchus is the work of the Sophist,
looked at on
its best side. But looked at as he really is, he is a
juggler who
teaches pupils to dispute about every thing — who palms
off falsehood
for truth |
198 |
| Doubt
started by the Eleate. How can it be possible either to
think or to speak falsely? |
199 |
| He
pursues the investigation of this problem by a series of
questions |
ib. |
| The
Sophist will reject our definition and escape, by
affirming that to
speak falsely is impossible. He will require us to make
out a rational
theory, explaining Non-Ens |
200 |
| The
Eleate turns from Non-Ens to Ens. Theories of various
philosophers about Ens |
ib. |
| Difficulties
about Ens are as great as those about Non-Ens |
201 |
| Whether
Ens
is Many or One? If Many, how Many? Difficulties about One
and
the Whole. Theorists about Ens cannot solve them |
201 |
| Theories
of those who do not recognise a definite number of Entia
or elements. Two classes thereof |
202 |
| 1.
The Materialist Philosophers. 2. The Friends of Forms or
Idealists, who recognise such Forms as the only real Entia |
ib. |
| Argument
against
the Materialists — Justice must be something, since it may
be
either present or absent, making sensible difference — But
Justice is
not a body |
203 |
| At
least many of them will concede this point, though not all
Ens is
common to the corporeal and the incorporeal. Ens is
equivalent to
potentiality |
204 |
| Argument
against
the Idealists — who distinguish Ens from the generated,
and say
that we hold communion with the former through our minds,
with the
latter through our bodies and senses |
ib. |
| Holding
communion
— What? Implies Relativity. Ens is known by the mind. It
therefore suffers or undergoes change. Ens includes both
the
unchangeable and the changeable |
205 |
| Motion
and rest are both of them Entia or realities. Both agree
in Ens. Ens is a tertium quid — distinct from
both. But how can anything be distinct from both? |
206 |
| Here
the Eleate breaks off without solution. He declares his
purpose to show, That Ens is as full of puzzle as Non-Ens
|
ib. |
| Argument
against
those who admit no predication to be legitimate, except
identical. How far Forms admit of intercommunion with each
other |
ib. |
| No
intercommunion between any distinct forms. Refuted. Common
speech is inconsistent with this hypothesis |
207 |
| Reciprocal
intercommunion of all Forms — inadmissible |
ib. |
| Some
Forms admit of intercommunion, others not. This is the
only admissible doctrine. Analogy of letters and syllables
|
ib. |
| Art
and skill are required to distinguish what Forms admit of
intercommunion, and what Forms do not. This is the special
intelligence
of the Philosopher, who lives in the bright region of Ens:
the Sophist
lives in the darkness of Non-Ens |
208 |
| He
comes to enquire what Non-Ens is. He takes for examination
five principal Forms — Motion — Rest — Ens — Same —
Different |
ib. |
| Form
of Diversum pervades all the others |
209 |
| Motion
is
different from Diversum, or is not Diversum. Motion is
different
from Ens — in other words, it is Non-Ens. Each of these
Forms is both
Ens and Non-Ens |
210 |
| By
Non-Ens, we do not mean anything contrary to Ens — we mean
only
something different from Ens. Non-Ens is a real Form, as
well as Ens |
ib. |
| The
Eleate claims to have refuted Parmenides, and to have
shown both that Non-Ens is a real Form, and also what it
is |
211 |
| The
theory now stated is the only one, yet given, which
justifies
predication as a legitimate process, with a predicate
different from
the subject |
212 |
| Enquiry,
whether the Form of Non-Ens can come into intercommunion
with the Forms of Proposition, Opinion, Judgment |
213 |
| Analysis
of a Proposition. Every Proposition must have a noun and a
verb — it must be proposition of Something. False
propositions, involve the Form of Non-Ens, in relation to
the particular subject |
ib. |
| Opinion,
Judgment,
Fancy, &c., are akin to Proposition, and may be also
false, by coming into partnership with the Form Non-Ens |
214 |
| It
thus appears that Falsehood, imitating Truth, is
theoretically
possible, and that there may be a profession, like that of
the Sophist,
engaged in producing it |
ib. |
| Logical
distribution
of Imitators — those who imitate what they know, or what
they do not know — of these last, some sincerely believe
themselves to
know, others are conscious that they do not know, and
designedly impose
upon others |
215 |
| Last
class divided — Those who impose on numerous auditors by
long discourse,
the Rhetor — Those who impose on select auditors, by short
question
and answer, making the respondent contradict himself — the
Sophist |
215 |
| Dialogue
closed. Remarks upon it. Characteristics ascribed to a
Sophist |
216 |
| These
characteristics may have belonged to other persons, but
they belonged in an especial manner to Sokrates himself |
ib. |
| The
conditions enumerated in the dialogue (except the taking
of a fee) fit Sokrates better than any other known person
|
217 |
| The
art which Plato calls “the thoroughbred and noble
Sophistical Art”
belongs to Sokrates and to no one else. The Elenchus was
peculiar to
him. Protagoras and Prodikus were not Sophists in this
sense |
218 |
| Universal
knowledge — was professed at that time by all Philosophers
— Plato, Aristotle, &c. |
219 |
| Inconsistency
of
Plato’s argument in the Sophistês. He says that the
Sophist is a
disputatious man who challenges every one for speaking
falsehood. He
says also that the Sophist is one who maintains false
propositions to
be impossible |
220 |
| Reasoning
of Plato about Non-Ens — No predications except identical
|
221 |
| Misconception
of the function of the copula in predication |
ib. |
| No
formal Grammar or Logic existed at that time. No analysis
or classification of propositions before the works of
Aristotle |
222 |
| Plato’s
declared
purpose in the Sophistês — To confute the various
schools of
thinkers — Antisthenes, Parmenides, the Materialists,
&c. |
223 |
| Plato’s
refutation throws light upon the doctrine of Antisthenes |
ib. |
| Plato’s
argument against the Materialists |
224 |
| Reply
open to the Materialists |
ib. |
| Plato’s
argument against the Idealists or Friends of Forms. Their
point of view against him |
225 |
| Plato
argues — That to know, and be known, is action and
passion, a mode of relativity |
226 |
| Plato’s
reasoning — compared with the points of view of both |
ib. |
| The
argument of Plato goes to an entire denial of the
Absolute, and a full establishment of the Relative |
227 |
| Coincidence
of his argument with the doctrine of Protagoras in the
Theætêtus |
ib. |
| The
Idealists maintained that Ideas or Forms were entirely
unchangeable and
eternal. Plato here denies this, and maintains that ideas
were partly
changeable, partly unchangeable |
228 |
| Plato’s
reasoning against the Materialists |
ib. |
| Difference
between
Concrete and Abstract, not then made conspicuous. Large
meaning
here given by Plato to Ens — comprehending not only
objects of
Perception, but objects of Conception besides |
229 |
| Narrower
meaning given by Materialists to Ens — they included only
Objects of Perception. Their reasoning as opposed to Plato
|
ib. |
| Different
definitions of Ens — by Plato — the Materialists, the
Idealists |
231 |
| Plato’s
views about Non-Ens examined |
ib. |
| His
review of the select Five Forms |
233 |
| Plato’s
doctrine — That Non-Ens is nothing more than different
from Ens |
ib. |
| Communion
of Non-Ens with proposition — possible and explicable |
235 |
| Imperfect
analysis of a proposition — Plato does not recognise the
predicate |
ib. |
| Plato’s
explanation of Non-Ens is not satisfactory — Objections to
it |
236 |
| Plato’s
view of the negative is erroneous. Logical maxim of
contradiction |
239 |
| Examination
of the illustrative propositions chosen by Plato — How do
we know that one is true, the other false? |
ib. |
| Necessity
of accepting the evidence of sense |
240 |
| Errors
of Antisthenes — depended partly on the imperfect formal
logic of that day |
241 |
| Doctrine
of the Sophistês — contradicts that of other
Platonic dialogues |
242 |
| The
persons whom Plato here attacks as Friends of Forms are
those who held
the same doctrine as Plato himself espouses in
Phædon, Republic,
&c. |
246 |
| The
Sophistês recedes from the Platonic point of view,
and approaches the Aristotelian |
247 |
| Aristotle
assumes without proof, that there are some propositions
true, others false |
249 |
| Plato
in the Sophistês has undertaken an impossible task —
He could not have proved, against his supposed adversary,
that there are false propositions |
ib. |
| What
must be assumed in all dialectic discussion |
251 |
| Discussion
and
theorising presuppose belief and disbelief, expressed in
set forms
of words. They imply predication, which Antisthenes
discarded |
252 |
| Precepts
and examples of logical partition, illustrated in the
Sophistês |
253 |
| Recommendation
of logical bipartition |
254 |
| Precepts
illustrated by the Philêbus |
ib. |
| Importance
of founding logical Partition on resemblances perceived by
sense |
255 |
| Province
of sensible perception — is not so much narrowed by Plato
here as it is in the Theætêtus |
256 |
| Comparison
of the Sophistês with the Phædrus |
257 |
| Comparison
of the Politikus with the Parmenidês |
258 |
| Variety
of method in dialectic research — Diversity of Plato |
259 |
| |
| |
| |
| CHAPTER XXX. |
|
POLITIKUS. |
| The
Politikus by itself, apart from the Sophistês |
260 |
| Views
of Plato on mensuration. Objects measured against each
other. Objects
compared with a common standard. In each Art, the purpose
to be
attained is the standard |
ib. |
| Purpose
in
the Sophistês and Politikus is — To attain dialectic
aptitude. This
is the standard of comparison whereby to judge whether the
means
employed are suitable |
261 |
| Plato’s
defence
of the Politikus against critics. Necessity that the
critic
shall declare explicitly what his standard of comparison
is |
262 |
| Comparison
of Politikus with Protagoras, Phædon,
Philêbus, &c. |
ib. |
| Definition
of
the statesman, or Governor. Scientific competence.
Sokratic point of
departure. Procedure of Plato in subdividing |
263 |
| King
during the Saturnian period, was of a breed superior to
the people — not so any longer |
264 |
| Distinction
of
causes Principal and Causes Auxiliary. The King is the
only
Principal Cause, but his auxiliaries pretend to be
principal also |
266 |
| Plato
does not admit the received classification of government.
It does not
touch the point upon which all true distinction ought to
be
founded — Scientific or Unscientific |
267 |
| Unscientific
governments
are counterfeits. Government by any numerous body must be
counterfeit. Government by the one scientific man is the
true
government |
268 |
| Fixed
laws, limiting the scientific Governor, are mischievous,
as they would
be for the physician and the steersman. Absurdity of
determining
medical practice by laws, and presuming every one to know
it |
269 |
| Government
by
fixed laws is better than lawless government by
unscientific men,
but worse than lawless government by scientific men. It is
a
second-best |
ib. |
| Comparison
of
unscientific governments. The one despot is the worse.
Democracy is
the least bad, because it is least of a government |
270 |
| The
true governor distinguished from the General, the Rhetor,
&c. They are all properly his subordinates and
auxiliaries |
271 |
| What
the scientific Governor will do. He will aim at the
formation of
virtuous citizens. He will weave together the energetic
virtues with
the gentle virtues. Natural dissidence between them |
272 |
| If
a man sins by excess of the energetic element, he is to be
killed
or banished: if of the gentle, he is to be made a slave.
The Governor
must keep up in the minds of the citizens an unanimous
standard of
ethical orthodoxy |
272 |
| Remarks
— Sokratic Ideal — Title to govern mankind derived
exclusively from scientific superiority in an individual
person |
273 |
| Different
ways in which this ideal is worked out by Plato and
Xenophon. The man of speculation and the man of action |
ib. |
| The
theory in the Politikus is the contradiction to that
theory which is assigned to Protagoras in the Protagoras |
274 |
| Points
of the Protagorean theory — rests upon common sentiment |
275 |
| Counter-Theory
in the Politikus. The exigencies of the Eleate in the
Politikus go much farther than those of Protagoras |
276 |
| The
Eleate complains that under the Protagorean theory no
adverse criticism
is allowed. The dissenter is either condemned to silence
or punished |
ib. |
| Intolerance
at
Athens, not so great as elsewhere. Plato complains of the
assumption
of infallibility in existing societies, but exacts it
severely in that
which he himself constructs |
277 |
| Theory
of the Politikus — distinguished three gradations of
polity. Gigantic individual force the worst |
278 |
| Comparison
of the Politikus with the Republic. Points of analogy and
difference |
279 |
| Comparison
of
the Politikus with the Kratylus. Dictatorial,
constructive, science
or art, common to both: applied in the former to social
administration — in the latter to the formation and
modification of
names |
281 |
| Courage
and
Temperance are assumed in the Politikus. No notice taken
of the
doubts and difficulties raised in Lachês and
Charmidês |
282 |
| Purpose
of
the difficulties in Plato’s Dialogues of Search — To
stimulate the
intellect of the hearer. His exposition does not give
solutions |
284 |
| |
| |
| |
| CHAPTER XXXI. |
|
KRATYLUS. |
| Persons
and subjects of the dialogue Kratylus — Sokrates has no
formed opinion, but is only a Searcher with the others |
285 |
| Argument
of
Sokrates against Hermogenes — all proceedings of nature
are conducted
according to fixed laws — speaking and naming among the
rest |
286 |
| The
name is a didactic instrument; fabricated by the law-giver
upon the
type of the Name-Form, and employed as well as
appreciated, by the
philosopher |
287 |
| Names
have an intrinsic aptitude for signifying one thing and
not another |
289 |
| Forms
of Names, as well as Forms of things nameable — essence of
the Nomen, to signify the Essence of its Nominatum |
ib. |
| Exclusive
competence of a privileged lawgiver, to discern these
essences, and to apportion names rightly |
290 |
| Counter-Theory,
which Sokrates here sets forth and impugns — the
Protagorean doctrine — Homo Mensura |
291 |
| Objection
by Sokrates — That Protagoras puts all men on a level as
to wisdom and folly, knowledge and ignorance |
292 |
| Objection
unfounded — What the Protagorean theory really affirms —
Belief always relative to the believer’s mind |
ib. |
| Each
man believes others to be wiser on various points than
himself — Belief
on authority — not inconsistent with the affirmation of
Protagoras |
293 |
| Analogy
of
physical processes (cutting and burning) appealed to by
Sokrates — does not sustain his inference against
Protagoras |
294 |
| Reply
of Protagoras to the Platonic objections |
295 |
| Sentiments
of
Belief and Disbelief, common to all men — Grounds of
belief and
disbelief, different with different men and different ages |
295 |
| Protagoras
did
not affirm, that Belief depended upon the will or
inclination of
each individual but that it was relative to the
circumstances of each
individual mind |
297 |
| Facts
of sense — some are the same to all sentient subjects,
others are different to different subjects. Grounds of
unanimity |
298 |
| Sokrates
exemplifies
his theory of the Absolute Name or the Name-Form. He
attempts to show the inherent rectitude of many existing
names. His
etymological transitions |
299 |
| These
transitions appear violent to a modern reader. They did
not appear so
to readers of Plato until this century. Modern discovery,
that they are
intended as caricatures to deride the Sophists |
302 |
| Dissent
from this theory — No proof that the Sophists ever
proposed etymologies |
304 |
| Plato
did not intend to propose mock-etymologies, or to deride
any one.
Protagoras could not be ridiculed here. Neither Hermogenes
nor Kratylus
understand the etymologies as caricature |
306 |
| Plato
intended his theory as serious, but his exemplifications
as admissible
guesses. He does not cite particular cases as proofs of a
theory, but
only as illustrating what he means |
308 |
| Sokrates
announces himself as Searcher. Other etymologists of
ancient times admitted etymologies as rash as those of
Plato |
310 |
| Continuance
of
the dialogue — Sokrates endeavours to explain how it is
that the
Names originally right have become so disguised and
spoiled |
312 |
| Letters,
as well as things, must be distinguished with their
essential properties, each must be adapted to each |
313 |
| Essential
significant aptitude consists in resemblance |
ib. |
| Sokrates
assumes that the Name-giving Lawgiver was a believer in
the Herakleitean theory |
314 |
| But
the Name-Giver may be mistaken or incompetent — the
rectitude of the name depends upon his knowledge |
315 |
| Changes
and transpositions introduced in the name — hard to follow
|
315 |
| Sokrates
qualifies and attenuates his original thesis |
316 |
| Conversation
of Sokrates with Kratylus; who upholds that original
thesis without any qualification |
ib. |
| Sokrates
goes still farther towards retracting it |
317 |
| There
are names better and worse — more like, or less like to
the things
named: Natural Names are the best, but they cannot always
be had. Names
may be significant by habit, though in an inferior way |
318 |
| All
names are not consistent with the theory of Herakleitus:
some are opposed to it |
319 |
| It is
not true to say, That Things can only be known through
their names |
320 |
| Unchangeable
Platonic Forms — opposed to the Herakleitean flux, which
is true only respecting sensible particulars |
ib. |
| Herakleitean
theory must not be assumed as certain. We must not put
implicit faith in names |
321 |
| Remarks
upon
the dialogue. Dissent from the opinion of Stallbaum and
others,
that it is intended to deride Protagoras and other
Sophists |
ib. |
| Theory
laid down by Sokrates à priori, in the
first part — Great difficulty, and ingenuity necessary, to
bring it into harmony with facts |
322 |
| Opposite
tendencies
of Sokrates in the last half of the dialogue — he
disconnects
his theory of Naming from the Herakleitean doctrine |
324 |
| Ideal
of the best system of naming — the Name-Giver ought to be
familiar with
the Platonic Ideas or Essences, and apportion his names
according to
resemblances among them |
325 |
| Comparison
of
Plato’s views about naming with those upon social
institutions.
Artistic, systematic construction — contrasted with
unpremeditated
unsystematic growth |
327 |
| Politikus
compared with Kratylus |
328 |
| Ideal
of Plato — Postulate of the One Wise Man — Badness of all
reality |
329 |
| Comparison
of
Kratylus, Theætêtus, and Sophistês, in
treatment of the
question respecting Non-Ens, and the possibility of false
propositions |
331 |
| Discrepancies
and inconsistencies of Plato, in his manner of handling
the same subject |
332 |
| No
common didactic purpose pervading the Dialogues — each is
a distinct composition, working out its own peculiar
argument |
ib. |
| |
| |
| |
| CHAPTER XXXII. |
|
PHILEBUS. |
| Character,
Personages, and Subject of the Philêbus |
334 |
| Protest
against the Sokratic Elenchus, and the purely negative
procedure |
335 |
| Enquiry
— What
mental condition will ensure to all men a happy life? Good
and
Happiness — correlative and co-extensive. Philêbus
declares for
Pleasure, Sokrates for Intelligence |
ib. |
| Good —
object of universal choice and attachment by men, animals,
and plants — all-sufficient — satisfies all desires |
ib. |
| Pleasures
are unlike to each other, and even opposite cognitions are
so likewise |
336 |
| Whether
Pleasure, or Wisdom, corresponds to this description?
Appeal to individual choice |
337 |
| First
Question submitted to Protarchus — Intense Pleasure,
without any intelligence — He declines to accept it |
338 |
| Second
Question — Whether he will accept a life of Intelligence
purely without any pleasure or pain? Answer — No |
ib. |
| It
is agreed on both sides, That the Good must be a Tertium
Quid. But
Sokrates undertakes to show, That Intelligence is more
cognate with it
than Pleasure |
339 |
| Difficulties
about
Unum et Multa. How can the One be Many? How can the Many
be One?
The difficulties are greatest about Generic Unity — how it
is
distributed among species and individuals |
ib. |
| Active
disputes upon this question at the time |
340 |
| Order
of Nature — Coalescence of the Finite with the Infinite.
The One — The Finite Many — The Infinite Many |
ib. |
| Mistake
commonly made — To look only for the One, and the Infinite
Many, without looking for the intermediate subdivisions |
341 |
| Illustration
from Speech and Music |
342 |
| Plato’s
explanation does not touch the difficulties which he had
himself recognised as existing |
343 |
| It is
nevertheless instructive, in regard to logical division
and classification |
344 |
| At
that time little thought had been bestowed upon
classification as a logical process |
ib. |
| Classification
— unconscious and conscious |
345 |
| Plato’s
doctrine about classification is not necessarily connected
with his Theory of Ideas |
ib. |
| Quadruple
distribution of Existences. 1. The Infinite. 2. The
Finient 3. Product of the two former. 4. Combining Cause
or Agency |
346 |
| Pleasure
and Pain belong to the first of these four Classes —
Cognition or Intelligence belongs to the fourth |
347 |
| In
the combination, essential to Good, of Intelligence with
Pleasure,
Intelligence is the more important of the two constituents
|
ib. |
| Intelligence
is the regulating principle — Pleasure is the
Indeterminate, requiring to be regulated |
348 |
| Pleasure
and
Pain must be explained together — Pain arises from the
disturbance
of the fundamental harmony of the system — Pleasure from
the restoration
of it |
ib. |
| Pleasure
presupposes Pain |
349 |
| Derivative
pleasures of memory and expectation belonging to mind
alone. Here you may find pleasure without pain |
ib. |
| A
life of Intelligence alone, without pain and without
pleasure, is
conceivable. Some may prefer it: at any rate it is
second-best |
ib. |
| Desire
belongs
to the mind, presupposes both a bodily want, and the
memory of
satisfaction previously had for it. The mind and body are
here
opposed. No true or pure pleasure therein |
350 |
| Can
pleasures be true or false? Sokrates maintains that they
are so |
351 |
| Reasons
given
by Sokrates. Pleasures attached to true opinions, are true
pleasures. The just man is favoured by the Gods, and will
have true
visions sent to him |
ib. |
| Protarchus
disputes
this — He thinks that there are some pleasures bad, but
none
false — Sokrates does not admit this, but reserves the
question |
352 |
| No
means of truly estimating pleasures and pains — False
estimate habitual — These are the false pleasures |
ib. |
| Much
of what is called pleasure is false. Gentle and gradual
changes do not
force themselves upon our notice either as pleasure or
pain. Absence of
pain not the same as pleasure |
353 |
| Opinion
of
the pleasure-hating philosophers — That pleasure is no
reality, but a
mere juggle. There is no reality except pain, and the
relief from pain |
354 |
| Sokrates
agrees with them in part, but not wholly |
ib. |
| Theory
of
the pleasure-haters — We must learn what pleasure is by
looking at
the intense pleasures — These are connected with
distempered body and
mind |
355 |
| The
intense pleasures belong to a state of sickness; but there
is more pleasure, on the whole, enjoyed in a state of
health |
356 |
| Sokrates
acknowledges
some pleasures to be true. Pleasures of beautiful colours,
odours, sounds, smells, &c. Pleasures of acquiring
knowledge |
ib. |
| Pure
and moderate pleasures admit of measure and proportion |
357 |
| Pleasure
is
generation, not substance or essence: it cannot therefore
be an End,
because all generation is only a means towards substance —
Pleasure
therefore cannot be the Good |
ib. |
| Other
reasons why pleasure is not the Good |
358 |
| Distinction
and
classification of the varieties of Knowledge or
Intelligence. Some
are more true and exact than others, according as they
admit more or
less of measuring and computation |
ib. |
| Arithmetic
and Geometry are twofold: As studied by the philosopher
and teacher: As applied by the artisan |
359 |
| Dialectic
is
the truest and purest of all Cognitions. Analogy between
Cognition
and Pleasure: in each, there are gradations of truth and
purity |
360 |
| Difference
with
Gorgias, who claims superiority for Rhetoric. Sokrates
admits that
Rhetoric is superior in usefulness and celebrity: but he
claims
superiority for Dialectic, as satisfying the lover of
truth |
ib. |
| Most
men look to opinions only, or study the phenomenal
manifestations of
the Kosmos. They neglect the unchangeable essences,
respecting which
alone pure truth can be obtained |
361 |
| Application.
Neither
Intelligence nor Pleasure separately, is the Good, but a
mixture of the two — Intelligence being the most
important. How are they
to be mixed? |
ib. |
| We
must include all Cognitions — not merely the truest, but
the others also. Life cannot be carried on without both |
362 |
| But
we must include no pleasures except the true, pure, and
necessary. The
others are not compatible with Cognition or Intelligence —
especially
the intense sexual pleasures |
ib. |
| What
causes the excellence of this mixture? It is Measure,
Proportion, Symmetry. To these Reason is more akin than
Pleasure |
363 |
| Quintuple
gradation in the Constituents of the Good. 1. Measure. 2.
Symmetry. 3. Intelligence. 4. Practical Arts and Right
Opinions. 5. True and Pure Pleasures |
364 |
| Remarks.
Sokrates does not claim for Good the unity of an Idea, but
a quasi-unity of analogy |
365 |
| Discussions
of
the time about Bonum. Extreme absolute view, maintained by
Eukleides: extreme relative by the Xenophontic Sokrates.
Plato here
blends the two in part; an Eclectic doctrine |
ib. |
| Inconvenience
of his method, blending Ontology with Ethics |
366 |
| Comparison
of Man to the Kosmos (which has reason, but no emotion) is
unnecessary and confusing |
367 |
| Plato
borrows from the Pythagoreans, but enlarges their
doctrine. Importance
of his views in dwelling upon systematic classification |
368 |
| Classification
broadly enunciated, and strongly recommended — yet feebly
applied — in this dialogue |
369 |
| What
is the Good? Discussed both in Philêbus and in
Republic. Comparison |
370 |
| Mistake
of
talking about Bonum confidently, as if it were known,
while it is
subject of constant dispute. Plato himself wavers about
it; gives
different explanations, and sometimes professes ignorance,
sometimes
talks about it confidently |
ib. |
| Plato
lays down tests by which Bonum may be determined: but the
answer in the Philêbus does not satisfy those tests
|
371 |
| Inconsistency
of Plato in his way of putting the question — The
alternative which he tenders has no fair application |
372 |
| Intelligence
and
Pleasure cannot be fairly compared — Pleasure is an End,
Intelligence a Means. Nothing can be compared with
Pleasure, except
some other End |
373 |
| The
Hedonists, while they laid down attainment of pleasure and
diminution
of pain, postulated Intelligence as the governing agency |
374 |
| Pleasures
of
Intelligence may be compared, and are compared by Plato,
with other
pleasures, and declared to be of more value. This is
arguing upon the
Hedonistic basis |
375 |
| Marked
antithesis in the Philêbus between pleasure and
avoidance of pain |
377 |
| The
Hedonists did not recognise this distinction — They
included both in their acknowledged End |
ib. |
| Arguments
of Plato against the intense pleasures — The Hedonists
enforced the same reasonable view |
378 |
| Different
points of view worked out by Plato in different dialogues
— Gorgias, Protagoras, Philêbus — True and False
Pleasures |
379 |
| Opposition
between the Gorgias and Philêbus, about Gorgias and
Rhetoric |
380 |
| Peculiarity
of the Philêbus — Plato applies the same principle
of classification — true and false — to Cognitions and
Pleasures |
382 |
| Distinction
of true and false — not applicable to pleasures |
ib. |
| Plato
acknowledges no truth and reality except in the Absolute —
Pleasures which he admits to be true — and why |
385 |
| Plato
could not have defended this small list of Pleasures, upon
his own
admission, against his opponents — the Pleasure-haters,
who disallowed
pleasures altogether |
387 |
| Sokrates
in this dialogue differs little from these Pleasure-haters
|
389 |
| Forced
conjunction of Kosmology and Ethics — defect of the
Philêbus |
391 |
| Directive
sovereignty of Measure — how explained and applied in the
Protagoras |
ib. |
| How
explained in Philêbus — no statement to what items
it is applied |
393 |
| Classification
of true and false — how Plato applies it to Cognitions |
394 |
| Valuable
principles of this classification — difference with other
dialogues |
395 |
| Close
of the Philêbus — Graduated elements of Good |
397 |
| Contrast
between the Philêbus and the Phædrus, and
Symposion, in respect to Pulchrum, and intense Emotions
generally |
398 |
| |
| |
| |
| CHAPTER XXXIII. |
|
MENEXENUS. |
| Persons
and situation of the dialogue |
401 |
| Funeral
harangue
at Athens — Choice of a public orator — Sokrates declares
the
task of the public orator to be easy — Comic exaggeration
of the effects
of the harangue |
401 |
| Sokrates
professes
to have learnt a funeral harangue from Aspasia, and to be
competent to recite it himself. Menexenus entreats him to
do so |
402 |
| Harangue
recited by Sokrates |
403 |
| Compliments
of Menexenus after Sokrates has finished, both to the
harangue itself and to Aspasia |
ib. |
| Supposed
period — shortly after the peace of Antalkidas |
ib. |
| Custom
of Athens about funeral harangues. Many such harangues
existed at
Athens, composed by distinguished orators or logographers
— Established
type of the harangue |
404 |
| Plato
in this harangue conforms to the established type — Topics
on which he insists |
405 |
| Consolation
and exhortation to surviving relatives |
407 |
| Admiration
felt for this harangue, both at the time and afterwards |
407 |
| Probable
motives
of Plato in composing it, shortly after he established
himself
at Athens as a teacher — His competition with Lysias —
Desire for
celebrity both as rhetor and as dialectician |
ib. |
| Menexenus
compared
with the view of rhetoric presented in the Gorgias —
Necessity
for an orator to conform to established sentiments |
409 |
| Colloquial
portion
of the Menexenus is probably intended as ridicule and
sneer at
Rhetoric — The harangue itself is serious, and intended as
an evidence
of Plato’s ability |
410 |
| Anachronism
of the Menexenus — Plato careless on this point |
411 |
| |
| |
| |
| CHAPTER XXXIV. |
|
KLEITOPHON. |
| Persons
and circumstances of Kleitophon |
413 |
| Conversation
of
Sokrates with Kleitophon alone: he alludes to observations
of an
unfavourable character recently made by Kleitophon, who
asks permission
to explain |
ib. |
| Explanation
given.
Kleitophon expresses gratitude and admiration for the
benefit
which he has derived from long companionship with Sokrates
|
414 |
| The
observations made by Sokrates have been most salutary and
stimulating
in awakening ardour for virtue. Arguments and analogies
commonly used
by Sokrates |
ib. |
| But
Sokrates does not explain what virtue is, nor how it is to
be attained.
Kleitophon has had enough of stimulus, and now wants
information how he
is to act |
415 |
| Questions
addressed by Kleitophon with this view, both to the
companions of Sokrates and to Sokrates himself |
416 |
| Replies
made by the friends of Sokrates unsatisfactory |
ib. |
| None
of them could explain what the special work of justice or
virtue was |
417 |
| Kleitophon
at
length asked the question from Sokrates himself. But
Sokrates did
not answer clearly. Kleitophon believes that Sokrates
knows, but will
not tell |
417 |
| Kleitophon
is
on the point of leaving Sokrates and going to
Thrasymachus. But
before leaving he addresses one last entreaty, that
Sokrates will speak
out clearly and explicitly |
418 |
| Remarks
on
the Kleitophon. Why Thrasyllus placed it in the eighth
Tetralogy
immediately before the Republic, and along with Kritias,
the other
fragment |
419 |
| Kleitophon
is genuine, and perfectly in harmony with a just theory of
Plato |
420 |
| It
could not have been published until after Plato’s death |
ib. |
| Reasons
why
the Kleitophon was never finished. It points out the
defects of
Sokrates, just as he himself confesses them in the Apology
|
421 |
| The
same defects also confessed in many of the Platonic and
Xenophontic dialogues |
422 |
| Forcible,
yet
respectful, manner in which these defects are set forth in
the
Kleitophon. Impossible to answer them in such a way as to
hold out
against the negative Elenchus of a Sokratic pupil |
423 |
| The
Kleitophon represents a point of view which many objectors
must have insisted on against Sokrates and Plato |
424 |
| The
Kleitophon was originally intended as a first book of the
Republic, but
was found too hard to answer. Reasons why the existing
first book was
substituted |
ib. |
